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Economists seeking to improve the efficiency of health care delivery frequently emphasize two issues:
the fragmented structure of physician practices and poorly designed physician incentives.  This paper
analyzes these issues from the perspective of organizational economics.  We begin with a brief  overview
of the structure of physician practices and observe that the long anticipated triumph of integrated care
delivery has largely gone unrealized. We then analyze the special problems that fragmentation poses
for the design of physician incentives.  Organizational economics suggests some promising incentive
strategies for this setting, but implementing these strategies is complicated by norms of autonomy
in the medical profession and by other factors that inhibit effective integration between hospitals and
physicians.  Compounding these problems are patterns of medical specialization that complicate coordination
among physicians.   We conclude by considering the policy implications of our analysis - paying particular
attention to proposed Accountable Care Organizations.
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It is a commonplace to observe that the health care delivery system in the U.S. is in crisis:  costs 
are high and rising rapidly; the quality of care is inadequate along important dimensions; and the delivery 
system is rife with inefficiencies and waste (Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, 2011).  What is 
less commonly acknowledged is that many of the prominent strategies for reforming the delivery system 
are based on strong, largely untested beliefs about how organizations can best coordinate and motivate the 
physicians involved in patient care.     
Health services researchers have long argued that a central problem with health care delivery in 
the US is fragmentation (Randall Cebul et al., 2008).  Individual patients are frequently treated by 
numerous care providers who have only weak organizational ties with one another, resulting in poor 
information flows and inadequate care coordination. This fragmentation especially inhibits the close 
coordination between diverse providers that is required to manage costly chronic diseases and to prevent 
errors and missteps.  The obvious fix, according to this view, is to induce physicians to join or construct 
more integrated care delivery systems.  As a step in this direction, the Patient Protection Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 directs the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to create a voluntary program for 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).  This program is designed to nudge the US health care system 
towards more integrated care delivery (Stephen M. Shortell et al., 2010) 
In contrast to the health services research community, many economists have argued that the 
fundamental problem with the delivery system is poor incentives, primarily physician incentives (Mark B. 
McClellan, 2011).  From this perspective, the continuing dominance of fee-for-service payment systems 
and flawed payment rates within these systems create strong incentives for physicians to deliver high-cost 
services.  Incentives to improve care quality are largely indirect and weak – patients presumably seek out 
higher quality physicians but have little ability to evaluate physician quality. Expensive and inefficient 3 
 
practice styles are further supported by overly generous insurance coverage, a consequence of tax breaks 
for employer-based coverage and the widespread use of supplemental Medicare coverage.
1      
The result is a bloated system where neither physicians nor patients are held directly accountable 
for the financial consequences of their care decisions.  The obvious fix, according to this view, is to get 
incentives right by reforming payment systems and tax policy (President's Council of Economic Advisors, 
2004).  Thus ACOs are encouraged to adopt new payment systems that, in principal, reward physicians 
for adopting practice styles that reduce costs and improve quality.
2  At the heart of these payment reform 
proposals is an economic theory of how best to motivate physicians using material incentives. 
In this paper, we present an overview of organizational economics as it applies to physician 
practices.  We begin in section one with a brief descriptive overview of the structure of physician 
practices.  Our point will be that the long anticipated triumph of integrated care delivery has largely gone 
unrealized.  While fewer physicians are working in solo practices than in the past, self-employed 
physicians in small group practices remain the industry norm.  Integration of physicians’ business 
functions has increased through a variety of cross-group and group-hospital affiliations, but integration of 
clinical activities has lagged.  In section two we discuss the problem of pay for performance from the 
perspective of the economic theory of principal agent models.  Building on these models, sections three 
and four take up the organizational economics of integrated care.  Section three examines the professional 
norms of autonomy and other factors that complicate effective integration between hospitals and 
physicians; and section four considers how medical specialization affects coordination across providers.  
In section 5, we consider how the problems of motivation and coordination play out in ACOs.   
                                                      
1 Even with less generous insurance, price competition would arguably remain weak as consumers (currently) have 
little ability to compare provider prices (Paul B. Ginsburg, 2007) and because prices in the Medicare market are 
administratively determined.     
2 The new payment models for ACOs have a variety of labels: “episode payments”, “comprehensive care 
payments”, and “comprehensive care global payments”. Other proposals for reforming payments to increase 
incentives for cost-conscious medicine involve combining high deductible insurance plans with tax advantaged 
health savings account.  These last proposals shift incentives onto patients rather than physicians and so lie beyond 
the scope of this paper. 4 
 
I.  A Descriptive Overview 
The physician workforce has evolved over time in both size and composition.  In the mid-20
th 
century, there were approximately 14 physicians per 10,000 persons in the United States, almost half of 
whom practiced general primary care (see Table 1).  In response to concerns about an impending 
physician shortage, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations successfully championed legislation 
subsidizing medical schools (David Blumenthal, 2004 ; Kenneth M. Ludmerer, 1999; Starr 1984), 
doubling the number of medical school graduates from 1965 to 1980, and eventually doubling the 
physician-to-population ratio from 1970 to 2000.  Despite a subsequent stabilization of medical school 
graduation rates, entry into the medical profession continued to modestly outpace population growth 
largely through an increase in international medical graduates, who now comprise a quarter of active 
physicians. 
  As medical knowledge and technology grew, the share of general practitioners in the medical 
profession declined more than 60 percent between 1949 and 1970, at which time fewer than 20 percent of 
active physicians practiced general primary care.  The share of general practitioners continued its steep 
decline through the 1980s, though the decline was partially offset by growing shares of physicians 
practicing in specialties that typically involve primary care services, i.e. pediatrics, obstetrics/gynecology 
and internal medicine.  Since 1990, the share of primary care physicians (general practitioners plus 
primary care specialties) has largely stabilized at 39 percent of all active physicians.  While the physician-
population ratio in the U.S. is similar to that in other developed countries, its share of primary care 
physicians is substantially lower and this has been cited by numerous health policy experts as an 
important deficiency in the U.S. health care delivery system (see, e.g., Barbara Starfield et al., 2005). 
  The trend towards an increasing concentration of medical specialists has been accompanied by an 
increasing “feminization” of the physician workforce and, more recently, by a decline in the labor supply 
of individual physicians.  Historically, the medical profession was overwhelmingly dominated by male 
physicians.  In 1970 about 7 percent of active physicians were women but the share of female physicians 
has grown consistently since then, reaching 31 percent by 2008.  Coinciding with this change has been a 5 
 
decline in the number of hours physicians work each week, especially since the mid-1990s (Douglas O. 
Staiger et al., 2010).  Thus, while active physicians per capita increased 17 percent since 1990, physician 
work hours per capita increased less than 7 percent.
3 
  Table 2 documents trends in care delivery settings.  Chief among these is a dramatic decrease in 
the amount of inpatient care provided.  Since 1975, hospital admission rates have declined roughly 25 
percent, while the length of hospital stays fell by almost one-half, representing a substantial decline in the 
amount of care physicians provide on an inpatient basis.  In contrast, hospital-based outpatient care 
increased dramatically over this time, driven in part by a steep rise in outpatient surgeries.
4  Meanwhile, 
the per capita rate of office-based visits increased 17 percent since 1975, but this aggregate figure 
combines two very different trends.  The rate of primary care visits was relatively flat over this period, 
consistent with relative stability in the (per capita) number of primary care physicians, while per capita 
office-based visits to specialists increased by more than 50 percent.   
  Thus a two-fold story emerges from Table 2.  First, physicians spend less time “making rounds” 
and performing procedures in an inpatient setting than they did in the past, decreasing the dependence of 
physicians on hospitals as the setting for delivering services.  Second, the decrease in inpatient care has 
coincided with a dramatic increase in ambulatory care delivered by medical specialists. 
  In Tables 3 and 4, we document how physician employment and practice arrangements have 
evolved over time.  The results in Table 3 report statistics derived from a series of physician surveys 
conducted by the American Medical Association – the Periodic Survey of Physicians (1975), the 
Socioeconomic Monitoring Study (1983-1999), and the Patient Care Physician Survey (2001) – through 
2001.
 5  More recent trends are documented in Table 4 drawing on data collected by the Center for 
                                                      
3 This, combined with the increasing health care demands of an aging population, has contributed to concerns 
regarding an impending physician shortage.  See, e.g. Richard A.  Cooper et al., 2002 and Gregory C. Kane et al., 
2009. 
4 Among non-federal community hospitals, the percent of surgeries conducted on an outpatient basis increased from 
16.3 percent in 1980 to 62.7 percent in 2000, but has since stabilized.  The rate was 63.2 percent in 2008.  (Source: 
National Center for Health Statistics, 2011.)   
5 The results in Table 3 rely on statistics published in AMA reports, leading to omitted measures in some years and a 
different categorization of “group size” after 1983.  6 
 
Studying Health Systems Change (HSC) – four waves of data from the Community Tracking Study 
(CTS) Physician Survey and the HSC 2008 Health Tracking Physician Survey.  Caution is always 
warranted in evaluating trends across different surveys.  A special concern in this case is the sampling 
methodology of the CTS Physician Survey, which focused on 60 communities in the US.  All statistics 
are weighted to be nationally representative, but trends in these communities may have differed from 
those in other areas, which could confound some of the cross-study patterns we observe.  Nonetheless, 
these results allow us to draw a number of conclusions.   
(1) Physician self-employment has declined, but remains the norm.
6 For much of U.S. history the 
prototypical physician was self-employed and in solo practice.  Even as recently as 1983, over 40 percent 
of physicians fit this model but its numbers have been declining.  By 2001 under 25 percent of physicians 
were self-employed in solo practices. Overall rates of physician self-employment largely track the decline 
in solo practitioners, falling from 76 percent in 1983, to around 64 percent in 2000 (in AMA data), to 
under 56 percent in 2008 (HSC data).  In the CTS data, self-employment rates were somewhat lower than 
in AMA data, but a similar modest decline in self-employment rates is observed.  
(2) Institutional employment increased, but then appears to have stabilized (probably).  The 
AMA data indicate that that the share of physicians working as employees of institutions (e.g. hospitals, 
medical schools, HMOs, etc.) grew from 20 to 28 percent from 1988 to 1994 – during the ascent of 
managed care – and then was fairly stable to 2001.  The HSC data similarly find that about 28 percent of 
physicians were employees of institutions in 2008, suggesting little change over the last decade.  The CTS 
data tell a somewhat conflicting story over the decade from 1996 to 2005, with rates of institutional 
employment seeming to increase from 31 percent to 36 percent.  Given the nature of the CTS sampling 
methodology, we are inclined to believe this trend may not be representative of the nation as a whole, and 
that national rates of institutional employment have probably stabilized at a level less than 30 percent. It is 
likely, however, that local health care markets are quite heterogeneous in this regard.  
                                                      
6 Following the AMA’s definition, we define “self-employed” as physicians with partial or full ownership in their 
main practice. In the vast majority of cases, this is ownership in a (non-institutional) group practice. 7 
 
  (3) Practice groups have gotten larger, but small practices remain the norm. Health system 
analysts have been predicting the demise of solo and small group practices for decades (see, e.g. Francis 
J. Crosson, 2009).  Based on AMA data, it appears that a majority of non-institutional physicians were in 
solo practice in 1975, declining to a third by 2001. Meanwhile, the share of employment in physician 
groups with more than 10 physicians grew from 12 percent to 19 percent between 1988 and 2001.  The 
CTS data indicates the share of non-institutional physicians in solo or two-physician practices declined 
from 59 percent in 1996-97 to 51 percent in 2004-05, while the share in groups with 6 or more physicians 
increased from 23 percent to 34 percent.  The historic record, then, is one of decreasing shares of 
physicians in the very smallest practices, and increasing shares in larger groups.  Despite this, however, 
small groups remain a common feature of the physician labor market. In 2008, 65 percent of non-
institutional physicians were in practices with 5 or fewer physicians, accounting for 46 percent of the 
physician workforce overall. 
  Practice size and the prevalence of physician institutional employment (in hospitals and staff-
model HMOs) provide an incomplete picture of the extent that individual physicians coordinate activities 
with one another and with other providers in the health care system.  Over the last few decades, physician 
groups have increasingly joined a variety of cross-group and group-hospital organizations intended to 
facilitate the collective goals of their participants.   
  Independent practice associations (IPAs) have emerged to provide solo and small group practices 
many of the benefits associated with larger group practice – economies of scale in insurance contract 
negotiations, contract oversight, and other administrative functions – while allowing participating 
physicians greater autonomy over their individual practices.  According to the Managed Care Information 
Center, there are currently about 500 IPAs with around 264,000 participating physicians, which equates to 
roughly 55 percent of the active physicians in group practice (Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., 2004).   
  A variety of organizations have emerged linking physicians and hospitals, with the goal of 
integrating service delivery and financing.  The most common of these, known as physician hospital 
organizations (PHOs), represent joint ventures between hospitals and private physicians to negotiate and 8 
 
manage insurance contracts.  PHOs also frequently operate clinics, employ physicians and staff, and 
acquire medical practices.  Some have established their own insurance products. At the apex of managed 
care in the mid 1990s, nearly a third of hospitals had one or more PHOs.  The fraction has subsequently 
declined, falling to 13.4 percent by 2008 (Health Forum American Hospital Association, 2010).  Gloria J. 
Bazzoli, Linda Dyan, Lawton R. Burns and Clarence Yap, 2004 found that other sorts of physician-
hospital arrangements had a similar pattern of initial increases followed by a subsequent decline. 
A third type of organization, known as management service organizations (MSOs), are 
organizations owned by physician groups, by physician-hospital ventures, or by investors in conjunction 
with physicians.  MSOs generally exist to provide practice management and administrative support, thus 
relieving practices of non-medical business functions.  In some cases, MSOs acquire the facilities and 
equipment of their client physicians which they then lease back to the physicians.
7 
The widespread existence of such organizations can give the impression that physicians, even 
those in small practice, are often tightly aligned with one another and frequently integrated with hospitals 
in their geographic area.  However, closer inspection suggests a more nuanced story (see Gloria J. 
Bazzoli, Linda Dyan, Lawton R. Burns and Clarence Yap, 2004 for an excellent review).  The rise of 
cross-group and group-hospital organizations was largely due to the market pressures imposed by 
managed care organizations.  Consolidating business functions allowed groups to achieve economies of 
scale in non-medical activities and, more importantly, increased the clout of providers in contract 
negotiations.   These organizations, however, were largely unsuccessful at integrating clinical activities 
across participating providers.  As managed care backed away from capitated contracts, the impetus to 
integrate clinical activities largely faded (Gloria J. Bazzoli, Linda Dyan, Lawton R. Burns and Clarence 
Yap, 2004). 
                                                      
7 There are many variations on IPAs, PHOs and MSOs.  For instance, physicians can belong to IPAs, which are in 
turn part of a PHO, which is itself administered with support from a MSO (Stephen M. Shortell et al., 1998). 
 9 
 
II.  Agency and Pay for Performance 
Physicians know more than patients or insurers about the set of effective treatment options 
available for an individual with a specific condition.  A patient’s own physician knows better than other 
physicians the specifics of the patient’s clinical and personal situation.  Specialists, with their advanced 
training and narrow focus on a small set of clinical issues, have a better understanding of treatment 
options in their specialty than the primary care providers who refer patients to them.  Each of these 
informational asymmetries creates an agency problem, i.e. a situation in which well-informed physicians 
recommend or implement courses of action that benefit the well-informed physician at the expense of 
patients, payers, and other less-well-informed parties.   
One way to resolve information asymmetries is to design incentive contracts that motivate the 
best informed agent to “do the right thing”.  Economics offers a well-developed theory for tackling these 
incentive design problems, the principal agent (PA) model.  The canonical PA model considers how a 
principal might structure incentives to elicit optimal behavior from better informed agents whose interests 
do not completely conform to the interests of the principal.  The principal conditions pay on observed 
outcomes and the actions taken by the agent reflect the influence of these incentives.  The starting point 
for the vast literature on PA models is a remarkable and quite general result: it is possible to implement a 
reward structure that can elicit efficient behavior on the part of the agent even when agents are entirely 
self-interested and even when performance measures are noisy and imperfect (James B. Rebitzer and 
Lowell J. Taylor, 2010).
8 
On the basis of this fundamental result, one might expect that the economist’s prescription for 
efficient health care delivery would be widespread use of pay for performance contracts.  Unfortunately 
                                                      
8 More precisely there exists a level of incentive intensity that generates first-best effort levels that principals will 
find profit maximizing to use.  Noise in performance measures creates variation in the income the agent receives, 
but for risk neutral agents this income variation will not affect their decisions.  Things are quite different, however, 
if agents are risk averse or if there are important aspects of performance or quality that are not included in 
performance measures.  We discuss these qualifications below. 10 
 
economic theory does not support such a simple policy prescription.  The qualifications on the 
fundamental PA result are almost as far reaching as the result itself.
9 
The first qualification has to do with the basic statistical properties of performance measures.  
Clinical outcomes are often influenced by some unknown combination of good actions (taken by the 
health care provider and/or the patient) and good luck.  Because of the great diversity of possible medical 
conditions a patient can manifest and the limited number of patients in a physician’s panel of patients, it is 
not at all clear that an individual physician’s practice offers enough observations to reliably distinguish 
good luck from good medical practice.  For example, a recent study (David J. Nyweide et al., 2009) finds 
that primary physician practices had annual median caseloads of 260 Medicare patients with 25 women 
eligible for mammography and 30 with diabetes.  With such low numbers, individual primary care 
physician practices simply do not have a sufficient caseload to detect a 10% improvement in the rate of 
use of such sensible preventive care as hemoglobin A1c testing.  If real improvements in such a simple to 
measure practice cannot be distinguished from changes due to random chance, rewarding process 
improvements comes uncomfortably close to rewarding luck.
10 
Noise in performance measures becomes even more important when agents are risk averse.
11  To 
see this, consider a setting in which physicians operate under a contract that rewards them for coming in 
under a threshold level of costs for their entire panel of patients.  If costs vary substantially in a year due 
to actions outside of a physician’s control, then large payouts for coming in under target add a 
considerable component of randomness to a physician’s compensation.  For risk-averse physicians, the 
increase in the variability of payments that result from incentive pay imposes a real cost.  To make 
                                                      
9 The PA model is quite abstract and so does not consider the many complications involved in applying pay for 
performance to a clinical environment.  For a clear overview of different approaches to applying performance pay 
in health care see Meredith Rosenthal, 2008. 
10 The low power of performance measures is exacerbated by the fact that care delivery is spread across a number of 
different providers and that the identity of the primary care provider is difficult to uncover from Medicare or from 
commercial insurance records.  For example, Hoangmai H. Pham et al., 2007 report that in their sample of 
Medicare patients,  the median patient saw two primary care physicians and five specialists working in four 
different practices. 
11 Performance measures are also likely to be imperfect because they do not include many important dimensions of 
quality.  We take this up when we discuss multi-tasking problems in section III. 11 
 
matters worse for incentive design, income variability rises with the intensity of the incentive.  As a 
practical matter, insurers or HMOs that ignore the cost of this increased risk when implementing pay for 
performance will find they will need to pay more to attract physicians to their networks. 
The problems posed by the low statistical power of clinical performance measures and the risk 
aversion of physicians can be mitigated by pooling information across many physicians.  David J. 
Nyweide, William B. Weeks, Daniel J. Gottlieb, Lawrence P. Casalino and Elliott S. Fisher, 2009 report 
that for practices with fewer than 11 primary care physicians, only 10% would have sufficient caseloads 
to detect a 10% relative improvement in physician performance.  In contrast, practices with 50 or more 
physicians would be able to detect a 10% relative performance improvement a 100% of the time.   
Averaging performance measures across doctors similarly reduces the variability of payouts from pay for 
performance systems.   
From an economic perspective, pooling or averaging performance measures is problematic 
because it makes agency problems worse.  The larger the physician panels across which outcomes are 
measured, the less will be the effect of an individual physician’s actions on group outcomes. The 
phenomenon of group incentives weakening as the size of the group increases is well understood in the 
economics literature where it is often referred to as the “free-riding” problem.  There is some evidence 
that free-riding matters for physician groups.  Martin Gaynor et al., 2004 study an HMO that divided 
physicians into panels of doctors (or PODS) for the purpose of measuring cost containment and awarding 
financial rewards to physicians who kept costs under a predetermined budget cap.  Consistent with free-
riding, they found that PODs with three physicians were much more effective at coming in under the cap 
than PODs with six or more physicians.  
 The relevance of free-riding problems is evident when one looks at the pay practices of 
physicians groups.  Physicians who work in group practices often share revenues among themselves.  
Revenue sharing has the appeal of allowing physicians to buffer variations in income (doctor A’s extra 
income in a good year will help offset doctor B’s poor income in a down year), but this insurance comes 
at the cost of weakening incentives.  If revenues are equally shared, a doctor in a three person group keeps 12 
 
1/3 of each dollar she earns.  Incentives weaken as the size of the group grows: a doctor in a five person 
group keeps 1/5
th  of the marginal dollar in revenues they earn and so on.  William E. Encinosa et al., 2007 
study the trade-off of insurance and incentives in medical practices and find that small groups are much 
more likely to adopt “equal sharing rules” than large groups.  As group size grows, physicians are allowed 
to keep a larger share of the revenues they bring in. 
 If it is costly or difficult to use incentives to resolve agency problems with meaningful pay for 
performance systems, organizations might find it profitable to reduce the need for incentives by seeking 
out physicians who have their principal’s interests at heart.  Consider a hypothetical physician who is 
committed to providing patients with the level of care the patient would choose for themselves if they 
knew as much as the physician knew and if the marginal cost of care were zero.  Finding physicians with 
such “altruistic” preferences may not be as hard as it seems.  Many aspects of medical education can be 
understood as efforts to inculcate this attitude into young physicians.  It might appear that having 
physicians with such pro-social, intrinsic motives eliminates the most important agency problem facing 
doctors: the problem of ensuring that physicians act in the interests of their insured patients.  But 
physicians face more than one agency problem and it is unlikely that the sort of intrinsic motives just 
described would resolve the agency problem for the insurers and managed care organizations that have 
the responsibility of paying for care.  Indeed, if insurance contracts were such that the patients themselves 
had to pay the direct cost of their care, they also might prefer a physician whose internal values moved 
them to balance the marginal benefit of care against its marginal cost. 
A deeper, but more speculative, limitation on the use of intrinsic motives to resolve agency 
problems is that these preferences may not co-exist easily with the use of material incentives.   A growing 
body of theoretical and experimental evidence in economics and psychology points toward the 
provocative possibility that powerful extrinsic rewards can actually weaken the efficacy of such pro-
social motives as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms (see 
Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2010, Samuel Bowles and Sung-Ha Hwang, 2008, and James 13 
 
B. Rebitzer and Lowell J. Taylor, 2010 for extensive reviews and discussions).
12  If true, this suggests that 
organizations that rely on a mix of material incentives and intrinsic motivators might be less efficient than 
organizations that rely solely on one or the other strategy to resolve agency issues.
13  
To sum up, the economics literature suggests that incentives matter, but that high powered pay for 
performance schemes may be too blunt a tool for handling the many agency problems that raise the cost 
and reduce the quality of health care.  This depressing conclusion is offset by some more recent results in 
the organizational economics literature suggesting that it may be possible to resolve agency issues with 
very low powered incentives by employing physicians in integrated health care delivery organizations.  It 
is to that issue that we now turn. 
 
III.  Professional Autonomy vs. Integration 
Hospitals and physicians together deliver the bulk of medical services in the United States, yet 
they are strangely divided from each other (Paul Starr, 1984).  Within hospitals, physician decisions are 
central to resource allocation and care processes, yet most physicians are quite independent of hospital 
management, working (as  most still do) in small single-specialty groups that they own.  Some physicians 
have “privileges” at more than one hospital and many more split their time and attention between hospital 
inpatient care and their office-based practices.  It is hard to think of another industry – outside of movie 
making and construction – that relies so heavily on independent contractors as key decision makers.  In 
virtually every industry that, like hospitals, relies on the mass-production of goods or services, key 
                                                      
12  A different, but related, possibility is that high-powered incentives create performance pressures and these 
pressures are themselves a cause of errors (Dan Ariely et al., 2009).  The experiments in this paper ask individuals 
to perform under incentives that are so powerful as to be outside of the subject’s previous experience.  For this 
reason the results may not generalize to physicians or other professionals who are selected for their ability to 
function in high pressure environments and whose training regularly exposes them to these environments.  
13 Samuel Bowles and Sung-Ha Hwang, 2008, p. 1813 identify a number of ways that material rewards might 
undermine the pro-social behavior that reduces agency problems.  A principal who adopts incentives may 
communicate belief that his agent is not trustworthy and thereby compromise the agent’s predisposition to act in 
the principal’s interest.  High powered incentives may compromise the agent’s sense of self-determination and so 
degrade intrinsic motives to “do the right thing”.  If agents establish their pro-social identity by taking costly 
actions that benefit others, then lots of incentive pay may make it harder to establish an identity consistent with 
intrinsic motives. 14 
 
decision makers are either employees of the enterprise or, much more rarely, its owners.  Does this 
difference matter for the efficiency of the health care system?  Organizational economics suggests that it 
might. 
For hospitals, the great advantage of having physicians as employees rather than independent 
contractors is that the employment relationship offers the possibility of resolving agency issues without 
the distortions created by high powered incentives.  This feature of employment relationships has been 
most clearly analyzed in the context of multi-task models, where agents have more critical tasks to 
perform than can be included in performance measures.  High powered incentives will, in this context, 
cause the agent to deliver too much of the metered tasks and not enough of the un-metered tasks.  
Employment relationships offer a straight-forward fix for these multi-task problems because employers 
have the ability to tell employees the tasks included in their job.  By restricting the range of tasks the 
employee can work on while at work, the employer reduces the opportunity cost of doing the tasks the 
employer favors.  As a result, a small amount of incentive can have a large effect on performance with 
lower levels of distortion.  Put slightly differently, employment relationships differ from market-based 
relationships in that firms can exert a high degree of influence on employee actions using very little pay 
for performance (Bengt Holmstrom, 1999; Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, 1994 ).  The strength of 
these low-powered incentives is increased when combined with other features of well-run organizations: 
the careful selection of new employees combined with their subsequent socialization into the goals and 
procedures of the enterprise.  The effectiveness of the combination of appropriate job design, careful 
selection, socialization and low powered incentives is captured by the term of art used in the management 
literature, high performance human resource systems (John Roberts, 2004). 
To see the power of weak incentives in the context of employment relationships imagine that a 
hospital wishes to improve the way in which surgical tools are sterilized and delivered to operating rooms 
– a surprisingly complicated process that involves surgeons, operating room nurses, hospital managers, 
and sterilization technicians (Stefanos Zenios et al., 2004).   Suppose further that operational efficiency 
can be improved by reducing the number and variety of surgical tools available to surgeons but that 15 
 
negotiating this change involves meetings and consultations with surgeons.  If surgeons are independent 
contractors paid per operation, any additional meeting takes time away from the next operation.  
Attending such a meeting then, is a very expensive task for the surgeon and the surgeon requires equally 
large benefits in order to be induced to participate.  This incentive problem is made worse by the fact that 
the benefits to the independent surgeon of reducing the number of surgical tools in circulation are clearly 
less than the benefits accruing to the hospital as a whole, especially if the surgeon divides his operating 
time across a number of hospitals.   
Contrast these incentives with those of a surgeon who is employed by a hospital and is paid on 
salary.  In this setting, attending meetings and participating in improving the sterilization process is not 
nearly so costly to the surgeon because the opportunity cost of his time is relatively low.  These incentives 
to participate are further strengthened by the relationships the physician builds with co-workers and also 
by the extent of tacit, firm-specific knowledge, acquired over the course of the employment relationship.
14  
Given these considerable advantages, why don’t we see hospitals employing physicians and 
forming large, integrated care delivery systems?  In most economic settings, the efficiency advantages of 
integrated systems should enable them to generate the resources to attract large numbers of physicians 
and members.   What prevents this from happening?  Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to this 
important issue.
15  The studies that do address it tend to focus on three potential explanations: the nature 
                                                      
14  Rajiv Jain et al.,  reports success at reducing multiple drug resistant staph infections (MRSA) through a bundle 
of practices that included surveillance, isolation, hand-washing and a culture change making every one having 
contact with the patient responsible for infection control.  Implementing this culture change was, likely made 
easier by the fact that physicians at the VA are also employees of the system.    Coordination may also be 
facilitated when the hospital employing physicians relies on a single, integrated information technology system, 
although recent empirical investigations find no evidence that investments in information technology improve 
care quality or reduce the costs of hospital care (Leila Agha, 2011).  There is, however, some evidence that the 
use of electronic health records in outpatient settings can improve care quality (Randall D. Cebul et al., 2011).   
 
15 In contrast, there has been a large literature documenting the productive and allocative inefficiencies in our care 
delivery systems.  For an incisive review see (Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, 2011).  16 
 
of economic competition in health care; strategic complementarities between payment systems and health 
care delivery; and the sociology of the medical profession.  We consider each of these in turn. 
16   
Regarding economic competition, if payers are unable to measure and reward high value added 
producers, then it may be that the enhanced efficiency of integrated systems will not translate into a 
sustainable competitive advantage.  Medicare, the biggest single buyer of health care services, does not 
evaluate the benefits associated with new medical technologies, and it is forbidden from using cost-
effectiveness analysis and from selectively contracting with more efficient physician groups.  Medicare 
regulatory boards charged with evaluating new technology are concerned primarily with whether new 
drugs or procedures offer positive benefits. (Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, 2011). Private 
insurance coverage is heavily influenced by Medicare coverage (Katherine Baicker and Amitabh 
Chandra, 2011).  In addition, private payers typically use Medicare prices as a reference point in 
bargaining, and contracts based on value creation are scarce.  Indeed it may be that some employers who 
purchase insurance for employees are not interested in or capable of evaluating the quality of care their 
employees receive.
17  The key challenge for the “failure of competition” explanation for the absence of 
integrated systems is explaining why competition in health care is different than in other sectors where 
markets do appear able to assess and reward efficient organizational designs. 
In contrast, the “strategic complementarities” explanation for the scarcity of integrated health 
delivery organizations refers to a generic set of explanations for the failure of advanced production 
methods to defuse rapidly across industries.  Indeed much of this work was originally inspired by the 
difficulties American manufacturers had in imitating and adopting more efficient “lean” manufacturing 
                                                      
16 A fourth possibility is that even if measured gains to integrated care delivery systems are large, there might be 
unobserved costs that swamp these gains.  We discuss this possibility when we analyze coordination costs and the 
rise of hospitalists in section 3 below. 
17 In a case study of Geisniger’s Provencare program, Clark and Rosenthal quote the results of conversations 
between Geisinger and the employers who buy their insurance. “We went with the health plan leadership and 
talked to a number of employers. We told them that we would guarantee delivery of the best care and that we 
wouldn’t submit a bill otherwise. The employers didn’t want any of that. Their eyes glazed over. They said, ‘As 
far as we know, we’re already buying best practices. The evidence we really care about is whether or not the 
patients need the procedure in the first place.  In addition, we don’t like all of the unpredictability in costs that you 
get with each patient. Give us one price per procedure and you worry about all the other stuff”. (Jonathan Clark 
and Meredith Rosenthal, 2008 p. 8) 17 
 
techniques that originated in Japan and the difficulties firms had in realizing productivity gains from the 
revolution in information technology (Casey Ichniowski et al., 1997, Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin M. Hitt, 
2000 and Paul A. David, 1990)  Suppose that managers have identified two complementary innovations, 
A and B.  Each innovation on its own produces a small benefit, but introducing A and B simultaneously 
yields a big improvement in productive efficiency.  For concreteness suppose that innovation A involves 
redesigning job responsibilities in ways that tap the tacit information and problem solving abilities of 
front line employees to solve customer problems and that innovation B involves hiring more educated 
workers.  Implementing either of these changes is not easy or inexpensive and so it is reasonable to expect 
firms to experiment with one or the other innovation rather than implementing them both simultaneously.  
Thus a firm might try action A and be disappointed in the result and therefore not follow-up with step B, 
hiring a more highly educated work force.  Similarly, firms might start with B, but not see much 
productivity gain because they did not implement step A and redesign job responsibilities in ways that 
allow the more educated workers to use their superior problem solving and communication skills.  It is 
only when firms reorganize and re-skill the workforce that the powerful complementarities between the 
two innovations are realized.  Put differently, incremental experimentation might not reveal the full 
productivity benefits of complementarity innovations and so the true value of innovations might not be 
discovered by managers. 
If complementarities can impede innovation within one organization, it becomes even harder 
when the complementary innovations span multiple organizations, i.e. when innovations are what game 
theorists call strategic complements.  This is Crosson’s (Francis J. Crosson, 2009) argument for the 
relative absence of integrated care organizations.  He proposes that the full efficiency gains of integrated 
care delivery can only be realized under bundled prospective payment systems.  But in communities with 
highly fragmented care delivery, it is hard to find providers who can carry the risks entailed by such 
payments.  As a result payers don’t innovate away from the status quo fee-for-service payment system 
and there is little competitive advantage for providers to move out of their currently fragmented delivery 
organizations.  One of the interesting implications of the “strategic complementarities” explanation is that 18 
 
it offers a natural role for public policy.  Specifically, the big public payers (Medicare and Medicaid) can 
force the issue by announcing that they will be moving towards a bundled prospective payment system 
that will benefit large integrated organizations.  This is the intellectual basis for the Accountable Care 
Organization initiative we discuss below. 
The third explanation for the relative scarcity of integrated care delivery organizations concerns 
social norms.  The simplest version of the social norms explanation is this:  physicians value professional 
autonomy and don’t want to be employed by anyone else.  There is considerable historical evidence that 
physicians as a learned profession did and do value their autonomy (Lawton R. Burns et al., 2010; Paul 
Starr, 1984).
18  Unfortunately, this fact alone is not likely to support a satisfactory explanation for 
fragmented delivery systems.  If fragmentation between physicians and hospitals was simply the result of 
a preference for “being your own boss”, then we should observe that physicians working for integrated 
systems enjoy a significant wage premium to compensate them for the disutility of their status as 
employees.  We are not aware of any study that documents such a pay differential.
 19 
More sophisticated models of social norms, however, offer a more promising line of 
investigation.  In models with a more sociological flavor, agents compare their actions with a prescribed 
set of behaviors (George A. Akerlof, 1976, George A. Akerlof, 1980) or with the actions of others in their 
reference groups (George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000, George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. 
Kranton, 2002). Akerlof and Kranton (2002), for example, argue that individual high school drop-outs are 
not responsive to the powerful economic gains that accompany graduation from high school because they 
are averse to adopting behaviors that increase the “distance” between them and the other drop outs in their 
group.  In this model, shifting away from the high drop-out equilibrium may be most easily accomplished 
                                                      
18 In private communication,  Victor Fuchs suggested to us that medical education plays an important role in 
propagating norms of professional autonomy – a theme also developed in Atul Gawande, 2011 
19 This is a specific application of the general economic principal of compensating wage differentials.  According to 
this theory, in a competitive labor market, individuals who are employed in odious or risky jobs will have to be 
compensated for choosing these jobs.  Search frictions and other market failures can greatly complicate the 
measurement of compensating wage differentials (see Kevin Lang and Sumon Majumdar, 2004).   So does the 
presence of social norms as we discuss below. 19 
 
not by adjusting the incentives of any given individual but by a group intervention that causes many of 
the high-school dropouts to stay in school at the same time.   
Similarly in a conventional economic analysis, if a physician decides to work as an employee at a 
hospital, only the hospital and the physician are involved in the transaction.   All else equal, if the hospital 
offers a pay differential that exceeds the value the physician personally places on autonomy, the physician 
will choose to abandon the autonomy of her independent practice and go to work as an employee of the 
hospital.   Things work quite differently, however, when norms enter the picture.  Norm violating 
transactions necessarily precipitate actions or changed perceptions (and loss of reputation) by third-party 
physicians who are not party to the transaction.  The involvement of these third parties allows 
professional norms to persist even when the gains to individuals from violating norms are large relative to 
their preference for the norm.   The involvement of third parties also suggests that stubbornly persistent 
norms may be greatly weakened by shocks that change the actions or perceptions of many physicians at 
once. 
20   
Just such a change is currently taking place in the medical profession.  For most of the 20
th 
century, professional norms in medicine, law and other learned professions were shaped by a labor force 
composed almost entirely of men, and most of these men had stay-at-home wives (Renee M. Landers et 
al., 1996).  In the 1970’s, however, women began entering professions in large numbers and today they 
account for a significant proportion of the labor force in both medicine and law.  For our purposes, the 
significance of this demographic transition is that these new entrants are likely to be influenced by a 
different set of norms than the male incumbents.  Specifically, these women are often married to male 
professionals who work long hours and they are for this reason quite likely to have to balance norms of 
medical practice against family responsibilities (Renee M. Landers, James B. Rebitzer and Lowell J. 
Taylor, 1996 discuss these issues for the case of lawyers).  To the extent that employment in a hospital or 
other large integrated delivery organization enables physicians to have shorter and more predictable hours 
                                                      
20 In Akerlof’s original model of social norms – a model for which he claimed direct relevance to physicians – he 
even derives an expression for the minimum number of “defectors” from the norm that would be required to cause 
the norms based equilibrium to collapse. 20 
 
than working as an entrepreneur in a small practice, women might be drawn to these positions and this 
may have the effect of undermining the norm of professional autonomy that has played such an important 
historical role in the US health care delivery system.
21 
Norms based models of professions shift attention from a narrow focus on individual incentives 
to a broader view that also includes incentives for action governing the entire profession.  From this 
perspective it is interesting to observe that in the early part of the 20
th Century the American Medical 
Association successfully lobbied for the introduction of “corporate practice of medicine” laws that made 
it illegal for physicians to be employed by other organizations, especially hospitals (James C. Robinson, 
1999).  The legal impact of these laws has diminished over time (as witnessed by the rise of professional 
hospitalists, an issue we take up below), but their influence is still observed in some states.
22 
If physician professional norms are important for understanding the failure of physician hospital 
integration in the US, then they might also be important for understanding other market outcomes in 
health care.  Few studies have examined this possibility either empirically or theoretically.  An exception 
is David J. Cooper and James B. Rebitzer, 2006.  In their model, managed care organizations compete for 
patients (who are the paying customers) and for physicians to participate in their network of providers.  
Patients can’t directly perceive quality and use as a proxy the number of physicians included in the 
managed care network.  The managed care organizations (MCOs) compete for physicians by offering a 
combination of salary and cost-containment incentives.   MCOs that write contracts with strict cost-
control incentives have lower costs and lower premiums but they also have a harder time recruiting 
                                                      
21 There is, as yet, not much empirical economics analyzing the ways in which the growth of women in professions 
alters physician practice norms, although there have been newspaper reports suggesting this (G. Harris, 2011).  
Renee M. Landers et al., 1996 have studied the evolution of work hours in the legal profession as a result of the 
influx of female lawyers.  Their analysis suggests that the evolution of hours may not be a smooth adjustment to 
the changing composition of the legal labor force.   Woman working in professions may also alter the norms under 
which their sons operate and so, over the long run, switch social norms.  Raquel Fernandez et al., 2004 find that 
the work experience of mothers-in-law seems to have a big effect on the labor force participation of their 
daughters in-law.   
22 The erosion of these laws does not entirely eliminate legal barriers for hospitals to employ physicians.  Arlen and 
Macleod (Jennifer Arlen and W. Bentley MacLeod, 2003, Jennifer Arlen and W. Bentley MacLeod, 2005) argue 
that tort law in the United States offers some advantages to hospitals that employ physicians as independent 
contractors rather than employees. 21 
 
physicians to their network of providers than other MCOs do.  In equilibrium, MCOs will segment the 
market.  Some will operate with stringent cost-control incentives, small physician panels and low 
premiums.  MCOs in this part of the market profit by attracting cost-conscious customers.  Other 
managed care organizations will have more lax cost-control incentives, bigger provider panels, higher 
premiums and they profit by attracting customers who put a greater emphasis on provider choice than 
they do on the cost of insurance.  This product differentiation creates disparities in treatment because 
physicians will use more resources treating policyholders in the high-cost MCOs than the low cost 
MCOs.  Given the many agency problems in this setting, an increase in competition is likely to cause a 
decline in medical costs – what some have referred to as a “race to the bottom”. 
Suppose now, that we introduce a physician norm against treatment disparities, perhaps because 
physicians do not like to deliver care that uses fewer resources than that delivered by other physicians in 
the market.  This norm makes it more difficult for low cost plans to attract physicians and so they must 
pay them more (while also reducing cost-containment incentives).  With low-cost plans behaving more 
like high cost plans, there is less product differentiation and no race to the bottom.  Indeed heightened 
competition reduces product differentiation and increases the overall level of resource utilization in the 
market.  In this way, norms of professional practice can help explain why the managed care revolution of 
the nineties failed to deliver on its promise to control the rise of medical costs.  The model also can 
account for the absence of the widely predicted “race to the bottom” in the managed care market of the 
1990s.
23 
IV.  Coordination, Specialization, and Innovation 
The economic ideas we have discussed so far have been primarily concerned with the problem of 
motivating physicians.  A second less well-developed economics literature focuses on problems of 
                                                      
23 Consistent with this model, Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, 2011 , p. 11 observe that there is a 
substantial literature showing that practice pattern norms drive similar care for all the patients that a provider sees, 
regardless of individual insurance status.  Lawton R. Burns, Jeff C. Goldsmith and Ralph W. Muller, 2010 report 
that in the 1990s “Health plans found employers reluctant to accept closed panel models that relied on a subset of 
providers in a given local market.  Employees did not want to be forced to switch physicians or hospitals because 
their employers chose a different health plan.  Broad-based health plans, such as preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs) and point of service pans (POS) triumphed over closed panel HMO plans” p. 50. 22 
 
coordinating care among physicians who must specialize in specific aspects of care because no single 
individual can master all medical knowledge. 
In his famous dictum that specialization is limited by the extent of the market, Adam Smith neatly 
summarized the role that markets play in coordinating the activity of highly efficient, specialized 
producers.  More recent work has augmented Smith’s analysis by considering the amount of 
specialization that will emerge in different economic settings (Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, 
1992). 
Becker and Murphy build a model in which specialization increases the productive efficiency of a 
team performing complementary tasks.  As specialization increases, however, so does the size of the team 
as well as the costs of coordinating activities among the increasingly specialized producers.  These 
coordination costs are determined by available technologies, especially communication and transportation 
technologies, but they can also be influenced by agency problems.  In Becker and Murphy’s (1992) 
formulation, increases in the stock of knowledge increase the payoff to team members of investing in 
more specialized knowledge.  Heightened specialization, it turns out, also increases the payoff to 
generating new knowledge.  Applied to medicine, this framework suggests a positive feedback in which 
dramatic increases in medical knowledge coincide with dramatic increases in the number of narrow 
medical sub-specialties.   
In a series of papers (David Meltzer, 2001, David. O. Meltzer and Jeanette W. Chung, 2010, and 
David O. Meltzer and Jeanette W. Chung, 2010), Meltzer and co-authors have used the tradeoff between 
coordination costs and specialization to analyze the growth of hospitalists.  Hospitalists are a new medical 
sub-specialty whose purpose is to care for patients when they are hospitalized and then return them to the 
care of their primary physicians after discharge from the hospital (Robert M. Wachter, 2004).  Primary 
care physicians have superior information about their patient’s specific situation and handing off in-
patient care to hospitalists creates the risk that key information will not be communicated.  For this 
reason, the rise of the hospitalist specialty creates coordination costs that were not present under the 
traditional US model in which primary care doctors supervised their patient’s care in both ambulatory and 23 
 
in-patient settings.  Improvements in communication technologies have the effect of reducing 
coordination costs and thus increasing the demand for hospitalists (David. O. Meltzer and Jeanette W. 
Chung, 2010), but this is not the whole story.    
Coordination costs are also determined by the switching costs of moving from ambulatory to 
inpatient settings. It is costly for physicians to switch from office-based care to visiting their hospitalized 
patients, and some of these costs are fixed (think of the time and effort costs of leaving the office and 
traveling to the hospital to see patients).  In the presence of these fixed switching costs, anything that 
reduces the number of patients a physician has in the hospital will reduce a primary care physician’s 
willingness to supervise their patient’s inpatient care.   For this reason, reductions in hospital length of 
stay, increases in the use of out-patient procedures in doctors’ offices or even a reduction in physician 
work hours and patient load can have the effect of increasing demand for hospitalists (David. O. Meltzer 
and Jeanette W. Chung, 2010, David O. Meltzer and Jeanette W. Chung, 2010).     
 The efficiency gains from specialization are not the only gains from the use of hospitalists.  
Hospitalists are often employed by hospitals but they may also work as contractors employed by outside 
firms or physician groups (Lawton R. Burns, Jeff C. Goldsmith and Ralph W. Muller, 2010).  Whatever 
their formal status, hospitals are likely to have more influence over hospitalist activities then they do over 
independent, primary care physicians.   Hospitals will therefore find their hospitalists relatively easy to 
engage process improvement initiatives.  By the same token, however, hospitals might use this heightened 
influence to encourage their hospitalists to shift costs onto other parts of the health care system.  Recent 
findings about the effect of treatment by hospitalists on Medicare patients give some cause for concern in 
this regard.  Yong-Fang Kuo and M James S. Goodwin, 2011, find that Medicare patients treated by 
hospitalists are associated with reduced length of stay and hospital charges but higher Medicare costs 30 
days after discharge as well as higher readmission rates 
The models of specialization we have so far discussed are appealing, but they do not consider the 
referral patterns we observe in medicine.  In medicine, primary care providers are generalists trained to 
recognize and treat common and less difficult conditions.  When less common or more difficult patients 24 
 
arrive, the primary care physicians refer them to specialists who have the extra training and experience 
required to handle these cases.  Luis Garicano, 2000 identifies conditions under which this sort of referral 
process is optimal. This model can also be used to generate predictions about how the work of primary 
care providers and specialists should vary with changes in cost parameters. A fall in the time and effort 
cost of communication with specialists increases the number of conditions that primary care physicians 
will refer to specialists while a fall in the costs of learning about rare conditions (via internet search for 
example) broadens the number of cases the primary care providers will handle themselves.  
The process of referral from generalist to specialist creates an agency problem.  Consider for 
example a patient who approaches her primary care doctor for treatment for a rash.  The primary care 
physician can either refer the patient to a dermatologist or treat the condition themselves and generate 
extra revenues.  If the dermatologists’ in-depth knowledge leads to superior and cost-effective treatment, 
the referral is efficient.  Efficient referrals may not occur, however, if the primary care physician loses too 
much revenue by referring the patient. 
24  While there may be little concern that an internist will fail to 
refer a breast cancer patient to a breast surgeon and oncologist, there are a very large number of 
conditions that fall into a gray area where the skills and knowledge of the generalist and specialist 
overlap. 
25  Luis Garicano and Tano Santos, 2004 analyze the incentives for optimal referrals in the 
context of professional services.
26  They find that in “bottom up” settings like medicine where generalists 
make the decision to refer to more highly trained specialists, professional partnerships may have a distinct 
advantage.  This is because the revenue sharing agreements in these partnerships allow the referring 
primary care doctor to earn some money from the fees the specialist generates.   Their theory also 
                                                      
24 Over referral is also possible if the primary care doctor addresses the rashes in a more cost-effective manner than 
the specialist, but does not receive sufficient compensation. 
25 Conditions in this grey area might include asthma, moderate depression, sprains of various sorts and even chest 
pain. 
26 Luis Garicano and Tano Santos, 2004 do not consider another sort of agency problem arising from referrals, 
whether physicians do a good job evaluating the quality of specialists to whom they refer patients.  Recent 
analyses of cardiac specialists (Erin M. Johnson, 2011, ) finds that very low quality specialists are more likely to 
stop practicing or change medical markets, suggesting that referring physicians engage in at least some 
rudimentary quality screening.   25 
 
suggests that to best realize the advantages of efficient referrals, multi-specialist groups ought to be 
composed of physicians working in areas where agency issues are likely to arise.  Thus there might be 
good incentive reasons to include internists and dermatologists in the same group, but not cardiac 
surgeons.  No studies, to our knowledge, have investigated the predictions of Luis Garicano and Tano 
Santos, 2004 in the context of medicine.
27 
As we have already observed, innovation in health care has resulted in a division of labor in 
which specialists with advanced training focus on the most difficult and advanced sort of medical 
practice.  Clayton M. Christensen et al., 2009, however, argue that innovations in treating the most 
common and routine sorts of care might also be very important.     
Clayton M. Christensen, Jerome H. Grossman and Jason Hwang, 2009 observes that health care 
delivery in the US must be concerned with treating two very different kinds of medical issues.  One the 
one hand, there are the difficult, hard to assess cases that require sophisticated pattern recognition and 
non-routine decision making by the physician (think, here, of the many conditions featured on the TV 
show House whose etiology or treatment protocol is murky).  On the other hand, there are the familiar 
cases whose treatment can be handled by clear, evidence-based protocols.   In the typical physician 
practice, the responsibility for both of these cases falls to the physician.  This division of labor makes 
some sense as individual patients can unexpectedly acquire one or the other type of condition, and their 
primary care physician is in an excellent position to coordinate care across both these types of issues.  
But, according to Clayton M. Christensen, Jerome H. Grossman and Jason Hwang, 2009 this approach to 
coordinating care also increases costs and dampens important innovation.  Care for the protocol based 
conditions, if broken out of the physician’s practice, will be less expensive because the caregiver is not an 
expensive or highly-trained generalist.   In addition, organizations that specialize in protocol-based care 
for common issues can use the techniques of modern management to implement continuous improvement 
processes that drive down costs and improve effectiveness.  The job of implementing these techniques 
                                                      
27 A full test of the model must consider as well that the referral advantages of large multi-specialty groups needs to 
be balanced against the free-riding problems that also increase with group.    26 
 
will be made simpler by the fact that physicians will not play a central role in these organizations.
 28  
More provocatively, Clayton M. Christensen, Jerome H. Grossman and Jason Hwang, 2009 cites 
evidence from other industries suggesting that innovations originating in the low-cost, low-prestige parts 
of an industry often end up transforming the production processes required for high-end goods and 
services as well.  If this pattern holds true for medicine, improvements in the delivery of care through 
“mini-clinics” and other limited care delivery operations may end up increasing the rate of innovation in 
the entire industry. 
 
V.  Prospects for Accountable Care Organizations. 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are an organizational innovation created as part of the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that was signed into 
law by President Obama in 2010.   Although ACOs are only a small part of a huge piece of legislation, 
they have attracted a great deal of attention from policy-makers, physicians and managers. 
29  
 ACOs are a network of hospitals and providers that contract with the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide care to a large bloc of Medicare patients (5,000 or more).
30  The 
contracts, which last for three years, create a single risk-bearing entity with incentives to control costs.  
                                                      
28 The notion that some types of innovation are best pursued in specific types of organizations is not unique to health 
care.  John Roberts, 2004 describes the difficulties of encouraging exploratory research in organizations focused 
on tightly controlled incremental innovation processes and the benefits that may result from placing the 
exploratory innovation in a bureaucratically isolated “skunk works”.   
29 As an indication of the interest in ACOs, consider the following incomplete list of articles over the past year or so 
in such leading journals as the New England Journal of Medicine, The Journal of the American Medical 
Association and Health Affairs (Francis J. Crosson, , Mark C. Shields et al., 2011, Stephen M. Shortell, Lawrence 
P. Casalino and Elliott S. Fisher, 2010, Sara Singer and Stephen M. Shortell, 2011, Paul B. Ginsburg, 2011, Zirui 
Song et al., 2011 ) 
30  ACO-like arrangements need not be limited to Medicare.  Zirui Song, Dana Gelb Safran, Bruce E. Landon, Ph.D. 
Yulei He, Randall P. Ellis, Robert E. Mechanic, Matthew P. Day and Ph.D. Michael E. Chernew, 2011 analyze the 
effects of a global double sided payment incentive system implemented by Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts.  The contract was similar in many respects to the shared savings program for Medicare but instead 
of Medicare patients it was implemented for HMO and point of service commercial populations.   The study 
reports that the new contract slowed spending growth modestly in its first year of operation and improved care 
quality.  The cost savings were largely achieved through changes in referral patterns (shifts in outpatient care 
toward facilities with lower fees, from lower expenditures for procedures, imaging and testing; and from a 
reduction in spending for enrollees with the highest expected spending) rather than through changes in utilization. 27 
 
ACOs that come in under their specified cost benchmarks earn a fraction of the savings.   In order to 
receive these payments the ACO must also meet stringent standards on 65 quality indicators that reflect 
patient and caregiver experience, care coordination, patient safety, preventative health, and health of at-
risk frail and elderly populations (Paul B. Ginsburg, 2011).  Ginsberg summarizes the intent of the 
compensation reward system nicely 
 “Built on a fee-for-service chassis, but with unrestricted patient choice, safeguards to 
prevent stinting on needed care, and quality standards, the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program attempts to avoid the pitfalls of capitation but still offer ACOs a financial upside 
if they reduce costs relative to a benchmark and report strong results on quality metrics. 
(Paul B. Ginsburg, 2011 , p.2085). 
 
It is interesting to consider the ACO experiment from the perspective of organizational 
economics.  For the statistical reasons we discussed in section I, ACOs must enroll large numbers of 
Medicare patients in order to generate reliable measures of savings (Elliott S. Fisher et al., 2009).  But, as 
we have emphasized, implementing pay for performance in large groups creates free-riding problems that 
can dramatically weaken incentives.  Put differently, if the ACO is comprised of independent contractor 
physicians connected only by a common hospital and a common incentive plan, they are unlikely to 
achieve the desired changes in provider behaviors.  Selection, socialization, training and careful job 
design are what gives a large organization the ability to influence the behavior of physicians in large 
groups.  If these elements are missing, it is hard to see ACOs having much effect on the way health care is 
delivered.   
 In order to achieve savings, the ACO has to manage the capabilities of hospitals and the primary 
care physicians who make up of the ACO.  The most straightforward way to manage these very different 
capabilities would be for hospitals to simply employ physicians, but as we have discussed there are 
historical, legal, strategic and sociological obstacles to achieving this goal.  Simply purchasing physician 
practices, as many hospitals and PHOs did during the 1990s, will not do the trick, but it may not be 
necessary for ACOs to employ all their primary care physicians.  Some organizations appear to be able to 
incorporate a significant number of non-employed physicians into ACO-like arrangements and this offers 28 
 
some hope for expanding the range of hospital-physician coordination.
31  A critical element in these 
organizations is to build legitimacy among independent physicians by making them part of the 
governance of the organization. 
Incorporating specialists into the ACO will be challenging because specialists are not required to 
limit themselves to a single ACO (Sara Singer and Stephen M. Shortell, 2011).  The referral model of  
Luis Garicano and Tano Santos, 2004 suggests that ACOs can reduce referrals by introducing training and 
computer assisted decision support that make it easier for generalists to substitute their own decisions for 
those of the specialists.  It may, for example, be better to train primary care physicians to treat rashes and 
acne rather than sending every case of rash or acne to a dermatologist.  On the other hand, the vast 
explosion in medical knowledge implies that there are limits to the substitution of generalist for specialist 
care.  In this case, Luis Garicano and Tano Santos, 2004 analysis suggests that efficiently managing 
referrals to specialists will likely entail bringing some specialists into the ACO.  Keeping these specialists 
fully occupied will also exert upward pressure on the optimal scale of ACOs. 
Taken together, our analysis suggests that ACOs are likely to have the biggest effect where care 
is already integrated.  Advocates of ACOs know this and see ACOs as emerging from five different 
practice arrangements.  In order of ease of implementation these are:  integrated delivery systems that 
combine insurance, hospitals, and physicians; multi-specialty group practices; physician hospital 
organizations; independent practice associations, and virtual physician organizations (Stephen M. 
Shortell, Lawrence P. Casalino and Elliott S. Fisher, 2010).    
Stephen M. Shortell, Lawrence P. Casalino and Elliott S. Fisher, 2010 argue for looser criteria for 
ACOs emerging from less supportive institutional settings.  This recommendation makes sense if the 
primary obstacle to the formation of integrated organizations was strategic complementarities, i.e. the 
absence of a big payer willing to employ prospective payment systems. This recommendation may not be 
                                                      
31 Mark C. Shields, Pankaj H. Patel, Martin Manning and Lee Sacks, 2011 describe how Advocate Physician 
Partners in Illinois combined a system of 10 hospitals and 800 physician employees with a network of 2700 
independent physicians. Their discussion emphasizes the importance of having physicians play a leadership role in 
the governance of the organization. 29 
 
right, however, if the primary barrier to integrated care comes from the difficult organizational issues we 
have highlighted in this essay.  Encouraging the formation of ACOs with have no hope of successfully 
altering care patterns creates entities whose only rationale would be to bargain harder with insurers – an 




Table 1:  Physicians Characteristics over Time  
  Year 
  1949 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008 
MDs per 10,000 population
a  14.1 14.5 16.4 20.6 24.7 28.9 31.4 
Active MDs per 10,000 population
  12.8 13.8 15.3 18.3 22.0 24.6 25.8 
   pct general practice/family medicine  50.1  35.6  18.6  14.5  12.9  12.5  12.0 
      pct  other  primary  care  15.0 21.1 24.6 26.7 26.1 27.2 27.0 
         
Percent female
b        7.1  11.4 17.2 25.2 31.2 
         
Mean hours worked per week
c    53.5  53.4  51.4  49.6  (2007) 
   male        54.8  54.8  53.4  51.7  
   female        41.3  46.0  44.8  44.4  
   self-employed        53.5  54.3  52.1  50.9  
   employed        53.4  51.8  51.0  49.0 
 
a Source: National Center for Health Statistics, 2011. Prior to 1970, MDs with unknown address or unclassified primary specialty were counted 
among active MDs.  Starting in 1970, MDs with unknown address or unclassified primary specialty were not counted as active.  Percent “other 
primary care” includes primary care specialties of internal medicine, obstetrics/gynecology and pediatrics.  Count of primary care physicians in 
obstetrics/gynecology is unavailable prior to 1970.  Table assumes 6.0 percent of active physicians were in obstetrics/gynecology in 1949 and 
1960, consistent with the fraction in 1970 (6.0 percent) and in 1980 (5.9 percent). 
b Source: American Medical Association,  (various years).  Reflects percent female among active MDs. 




   
 
Table 2: Changes in Care Delivery Settings  
Year 
1975 1980  1985  1990 1995  2000  2005 2008 
Hospital-based care 
  Admissions (per 100 population)  16.7  17.1  15.3  13.5  12.7  12.4  12.5  12.3 
  Mean length-of-stay  11.4  10.0  9.1  9.1  7.8  6.8  6.5  6.3 
  Outpatient visits (per capita)  1.18  1.16  1.19  1.48  1.84  2.10  2.28  2.33 
Office-based care 
  Visits (per capita)   2.69  2.63  2.67  2.82  2.65  2.92  3.26  3.14 
     primary care visits (per capita)  1.85  1.74  1.66  1.79  1.63  1.72  1.92  1.87 
     specialist visits (per capita)  0.84  0.89  1.01  1.03  1.02  1.20  1.34  1.27 
Note: Hospital outpatient visits include visits to the emergency room, hospital outpatient departments, referred visits (pharmacy, EKG, radiology), 
and outpatient surgeries.   
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, 2011.   
  
 
Table 3:  Trends in Employment and Group Size, to 2001   










Panel A:  Employment  
Self-employed    75.8   72.1     57.7  62.0  65.5 
   solo practice    40.5   38.5    29.3  26.4  24.4 
Employee   24.2    27.9   42.3   38.0  34.5 
   group practice      7.8    14.6    8.6  8.4 
      institutional    20.1   27.7   29.4  26.1 
      hospital      4.1    6.7    7.7  7.7 
      medical school      5.6    8.2  7.7  7.4 
      HMO      2.3    4.1  2.6  1.8 
      state/local govt      4.7    3.2  3.2  2.4 
      other      3.3    5.5  8.2  6.8 
Panel B:  Group Size 
 
      solo  practice  54.2  48.9        
   2 physicians   14.1  12.5 
   3-7 physicians  21.3  24.3 
   8-25 physicians  6.0  8.8 
      25+  physicians 4.5  5.3        
(1988-2001  categories)          
      solo  practice      49.3 45.5 42.9 39.0 37.7 33.2 
      2-4  physicians      27.2 29.0 28.2 25.8 25.5 26.4 
      5-9  physicians      11.6 13.2 14.7 16.6 15.5 16.3 
   10-49 physicians      8.1  8.8  10.7  13.8  15.2  17.0 
      50+  physicians      3.8 3.5 3.5 4.8 6.2 7.2 
Note: Employment statistics refer to nonfederal post-GME patient care physicians.  Self-employed physicians are defined as those with full or part 
ownership in their main practice.  Institutional employee category “other” includes physicians practicing in community health centers, freestanding 
clinics and independent contractors in other institutional settings.  Group size statistics additional restricted to physicians in solo or group practice. 
   
 
a Source: (1975) AMA Periodic Survey of Physicians and (1983) AMA Socioeconomic Monitoring System.  Employment statistics as reported in 
Phillip R. Kletke et al., 1996.  Practice size statistics as reported in Robert L. Ohsfeldt, 1983.    
b Source: AMA Socioeconomic Monitoring System.  Employment statistics as reported in Phillip R. Kletke, David W. Emmons and Kurt D. Gillis, 
1996.  Practice size statistics as reported in Phillip R. Kletke, 1998. 
c Source: AMA Socioeconomic Monitoring System, as reported by Carol K. Kane, 2004a. 
d Source: AMA Patient Care Physician Survey, as reported by Carol K. Kane, 2004b. 
  
 
Table 4:  Recent Trends in Employment, Practice Setting and Group Size, 1996-2008  







Panel A:  Employment  
Self-employed  61.6 56.7 55.9 54.4 56.3 
   solo/2-physician practice  37.4  33.6  31.2  28.1  28.5 
Employee  38.4 43.3 44.1 45.6 43.7 
Panel B:  Practice Setting  
Solo/group  practice  68.9 64.7 65.4 64.1 72 
Hospital  10.7 12.6 12  12  13.1 
Medical  School  7.3 7.7 8.4 9.3 7.3 
HMO  5  4.6 3.8 4.5 3.5 
Other  8.3  10.5 10.4 10.1 4.1 
Panel C:  Group Size 
Solo/2-Physician  Practices  59.1 57.8 53.8 50.7 44.4 
3 to 5 Physician Practices  17.7  14.8  17.9  15.3  20.1 
6 to 50 Physician Practices  19.0  21.9  24.2  27.5  26.9 
>50  Physician  Practices  4.2 5.4 4.1 6.6 8.5 
Note: Statistics calculated to be nationally representative of all non-federal physicians who spend at least 
20 hours a week in direct patient care.  Self-employed physicians are defined as those with full or part 
ownership in their main practice.  Practice setting category “Other” includes physicians practicing in 
community health centers, freestanding clinics and other settings, as well as independent contractors.  
Group size statistics restricted to physicians in solo or group practice. 
 
a Source: Community Tracking Study Physician Survey.  See Allison Liebhaber and Joy M. Grossman, 
2007for details. 
b Source: HSC 2008 Health Tracking Physician Survey.  See Ellyn R. Boukus et al., 2009 for details. 
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